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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
If the transfer were not a voidable transfer or if joint liability
were imposed there are still several ways to adjust the liability. It
does not seem that the liability should depend on whether payment
was in the form of check or cash. If this were payment of an ante-
cedent debt by cash it would not be a valid transfer since such a
payment is not for "present fair equivalent value." 33 If joint
liability were imposed in this situation the payee creditor would be
in a better position than the bankrupt's other creditors. If the bank
pays first and has no right of indemnity against the creditor, then
the creditor, to the extent of the bank's contribution, will be favored
over the other creditors. On the other hand, the bank's loss would
be total unless by subrogation it were allowed to participate in the
distribution of the bankrupt's estate. The right of subrogation here
would depend on whether this transaction was viewed as if the bank,
by paying the judgment, had paid the creditor's claim and thus stood
in his position as an unsecured creditor. 4 But if the creditor were
to pay the entire judgment, he would still be able to share in the
bankrupt's estate as an unsecured creditor.
The Court in Marin adopted the simplest and most equitable
solution in this situation by limiting the trustee to an action against
the payee. This would result in the payee bearing the entire loss
resulting from distribution by the bankrupt estate. In a situation,
as here, where the bank has had no notice of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding this is simply a restoration to the status quo.
FRANcIS X. HANLON
Constitutional Law-Is the Restricted Cross-Examination Rule
Embodied in the Fifth Amendm'nt?
In the historic Supreme Court decision of Malloy v. Hoga1 it
was established that the fifth amendment guarantee of freedom from
self-incrimination is imposed on the states by way of the fourteenth
amendment.' The recent case of Spevak v. Klien3 emphasized the
scope of this determination by holding that no group or classifica-
"See note 9 sitpra.
,See, 40 MINN. L. Iv. 499 (1956).
378 U.S. 1 (1964). See notes in 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 9 (1964); 73 YALE
L.J. 1491 (1964).
'U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." For ex-
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tion of people is without its purview.4 But an additional problem
area remains that may have a significant impact on North Carolina
procedure. This is concerned with the rules governing the scope
of cross-examination as they affect the criminal defendant who
chooses to testify.
North Carolina adheres to the "wide-open '5 rule of cross-exami-
nation. This procedure dictates that the criminal defendant waives
his immunity from self-incrimination by the mere act of taking the
stand.' As a consequence he is subjected to cross-examination on
any matter relevant to the issues being tried.7 The federal courts,
however, follow a restrictive rule' whereby the defendant technically
waives the privilege by testifying in his own behalf, but can be cross-
examined only on matters brought out on direct.' It is uncertain
whether this rule is based on procedural 0 or constitutional11 con-
amples of other constitutional protections that have been imposed on the
states in recent years see e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
(sixth amendment guarantee of the right of confrontation); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment bar of illegally seized
evidence).
'87 Sup. Ct. 625 (1967).
'Id. at 628.
'The "wide-open" rule is so designated because it does not confine the
scope of inquiry to matters testified to on direct. See McCoRMICK, Evi-
DENCE §§ 21, 26, 131 (1954).
'This is established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1953), which provides
in part:
In the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other proceedings
against persons charged with the commission of crimes . . .the per-
son so charged is, at his request, but not otherwise, a competent wit-
ness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any pre-
sumption against him. But every such person examined as a witness
shall be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses.
' State v. Dickerson, 189 N.C. 327, 127 S.E. 256 (1925). See STAxs-
BURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§ 56-57 (2d ed. 1963).
'For discussion of the federal approach see Orfield, Examination of
Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 4 ARiz. L. REv. 215 (1963); Orfield,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Federal Cases, 25 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 503, 547 (1964); 5 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 116 (1937); 36 U. DET. L.J.
162 (1958).
'Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304 (1900); United States v.
Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80
(4th Cir. 1941); Madden v. United States, 20 F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 554 (1927); Tucker v. United States, 5 F.2d 818 (8th
Cir. 1925). See also MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 26 (1954).
"o Some cases merely state that the defendant becomes subject to cross-
examination to the same degree as any other witness. This, of course, means
the restrictive rule. See e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304
(1900).
" The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tucker v. United States, 5
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cepts, but if the Supreme Court should determine that it is a neces-
sary appendage to the fifth amendment protection, the North Caro-
lina practice would become unconstitutional."
In exploring such a possibility, two considerations may prove
controlling. The Court in recent years has not hesitated to expand
the number of individual protections available to criminal defendants
in state court proceedings.1" Moreover, particular attention has been
paid to alleviating conditions surrounding the assertion of constitu-
tional privileges that tend to undermine the strength of the right
guaranteed. For example, the Court reasoned in Escobedo v. Illi-
nois' 4 that guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to counsel at
the trial stage alone is insufficient when the possibility exists that a
pre-trial confession rendered when the accused did not have benefit
of counsel may negate any advantage of courtroom representation. 15
Applying this rationale to the protection of the self-incrimination
privilege, cross-examination procedures of the North Carolina vari-
ety 6 in which a defendant who takes the stand "is subject to the
same treatment as other witnesses,"'17 become suspect. The privilege
has little value for an accused who deems it expedient to testify but
can ill afford broad cross-examination. It is submitted that the
existence of such an inherent restraint may lead the Court to con-
sider the "wide-open" rule an unwarranted threat to the exercise of
the privilege.
A second consideration is evidenced by the Malloy concern for
F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1925), accorded the rule constitutional sanction. The
court determined that when the defendant was questioned concerning mat-
ters not brought out on direct testimony, he was "compelled . . . over
seasonable and proper objection to be a witness against himself, in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 824. For ex-
amples of both prior and subsequent cases that make no mention of Consti-
tutional implications in the rule see e.g., Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178
U.S. 304 (1900); United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966).
1" North Carolina is not the only state in which such a determination
would invalidate existing practice. Arizona, for example, has recently re-
stated its position that a criminal defendant who takes the stand to give
testimony in his own behalf is "subject to cross-examination as to all mat-
ters relevant to the issues being tried." State v. Taylor, 99 Ariz. 85, 407
P.2d 59, 64 (1965). Accord, Shelton v. State, 397 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1965).
1" See note 2 supra.
'378 U.S. 478 (1964). See 43 N.C.L. REv. 187 (1964).
15378 U.S. at 486.
' See STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 108 (2d ed. 1963).
1 Id. § 56, at 116.
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variations in the implementation of constitutional protections in
state and federal forums. The Court reasoned that as the first,
fourth, and sixth amendment are enforced according to the same
standards in both,' s it would be incongruous to deny a criminal
defendant the same uniformity of application when considering an
assertion of a fifth amendment privilege.' It is conceded that the
Court's attention was focused on claim rather than waiver of privi-
lege, but it must be remembered that the practical effect of the
federal limitation on the scope of cross-examination is to make
waiver incomplete, leaving a portion of the privilege intact.2" Thus,
whether the restricted rule is considered a part of the privilege or
merely a collateral result of its waiver, it is impossible to disasso-
ciate one from the other. Both are interwoven in the trial context
and become a unit for consideration by an accused who must weigh
the advantages of a claim of privilege in light of the consequences of
waiver. As this determination may well depend on the forum be-
cause of the variance in cross-examination procedure, the Court's
propensity for uniformity" may render the "wide-open" rule un-
acceptable.
W. H. FAULK, JR.
Constitutional Law-"Freedom of Association's" Inapplicability
to Greek-letter Fraternities
In April of 1965 the brothers of Sigma Chi fraternity at Stan-
ford University issued an invitation of membership to Kenny Wash-
ington, a Negro-thereby breaking with century-old traditions.'
His admittance to the fraternity was contradictory to the "all white"
heritage of Sigma Chi.2 Shortly after Washington's pledging, the
national fraternity suspended the Stanford chapter-the first of a
21 378 U.S. at 10.
29 Id. at 11.
20 United States v. Pate, 357 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966).
21 See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
Sigma Chi was founded at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, in 1855.
13 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 402 (1948).
'A few weeks after Washington's "pledging," the national president of
Sigma Chi predicted that no Negro would ever become a member of the
fraternity. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1965, § 1, p. 14.
'The national executive committee of the fraternity stated that the sus-
pension of the chapter had nothing to do with any membership question.
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